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PRIVATIZING  WORKPLACE  PRIVACY
Paul M. Secunda*
Perhaps “the” question in this age of workplace technological innovation
concerns the amount of privacy employees should have in electronic locations in
the workplace.  An important related question is whether public-sector and pri-
vate-sector employees, who have different legal statuses under the state action
doctrine, should enjoy the same level of workplace privacy.  Recently, in the
Fourth Amendment  workplace privacy case of City of Ontario v. Quon, the
United States Supreme Court considered both of these questions. Quon
involved alleged privacy violations by a city police department when it audited
an officer’s text messages from his city-issued pager.
In a cryptic decision, Justice Kennedy held for a unanimous Court that
assuming the officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pager, the
City’s search of the pager was reasonable under two possible legal tests.  First,
under the plurality test enunciated by the Supreme Court in O’Connor v.
Ortega, it was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related
purpose and was not excessive in scope.  Second, under the test outlined by
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in O’Connor, it was reasonable
because it would be considered “reasonable and normal” in the private-sector
workplace.  To varying degrees, both of these legal tests suggest that questions of
workplace privacy in the public and private sectors should be treated the same.
Rather than elevating private-sector privacy rights to the public-sector
level, however, Quon suggests that public employee workplace privacy rights
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should be reduced to the level of employees in the private sector.  Maintaining
that public-sector workers are entitled to greater levels of privacy protections
based on the text of the Constitution, the power of the government as employer,
and the critical oversight role public employees play in American democracy,
this Article argues for a new, two-step workplace privacy analysis which first
focuses on the purpose of the search and then applies presumptively the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements to those searches
undertaken for investigatory purposes.
INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom has long held that public employees with
federal constitutional protections have stronger workplace rights than
their private-sector counterparts.  For instance, Samuel Issacharoff
observed in 1990 that, “[s]ince the 1960s, the public sector has been
the source of dramatic expansions in employee rights to free expres-
sion, due process, and privacy.”1  That this “dramatic expansion”
occurred solely in the public sector stemmed from the fact that fed-
eral constitutional claims are only able to be brought against public
employers as a result of the state action doctrine.2
In the workplace privacy context,3 this state of affairs meant that
it was generally believed that public employees under the Fourth
1 Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV. L. REV. 607, 616
(1990) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
(1989)) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990)); see also
Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J.
1, 3 (1991) (maintaining that positive changes in American workplace law at that time
were based on “bringing . . . constitutional values to the private sector workplace”).
2 Under the state action doctrine, only injuries attributed to the “state” are sub-
ject to constitutional provisions, such as the search and seizure provisions of the
Fourth Amendment. See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Dis-
tinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 330
(1993) (“[T]he idea [is] that the Constitution is especially concerned with the limita-
tion of ‘public’ power and, by the same token, that it is not ordinarily concerned with
the regulation of other, ‘private,’ sources of power.”); see also Novosel v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 903 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“[T]he [panel] opinion ignores the state action requirement of
[F]irst [A]mendment jurisprudence, particularly by its repeated, and, in my view,
inappropriate citation of public employee cases, and by its implicit assumption that a
public policy against government interference with free speech may be readily
extended to private actors in voluntary association with one another.” (citation
omitted)).
3 As will be discussed in greater detail below, “workplace privacy” as used in this
Article refers solely to employee privacy interests in physical and electronic locations
in the workplace.  This definition has been selected because it is most closely aligned
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Amendment4 had greater expectations of privacy than their private-
sector counterparts.5  Without federal constitutional protections, pri-
vate-sector employees must instead rely on either the common law of
torts (currently being restated in Chapter 7 of the Restatement of
Employment Law)6 or on various other federal and state legislative
enactments,7 for their workplace privacy rights.
Yet, this understanding that public employees have more privacy
protection in the workplace than their private-sector counterparts has
been placed in considerable doubt by two recent developments.  First,
the startling pace of workplace technological innovation has made it
with the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment in the public work-
place.  Workplace privacy, as used in this Article, does not refer to a myriad of other
potential privacy and autonomy interests that exist at, and away from, the workplace.
See generally infra Part II.A.
4 The Fourth Amendment, in pertinent part, states: “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  This ban on “unrea-
sonable search and seizures” was made applicable to the action of states and their
agents by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding the Fourth Amendment to be enforce-
able against states through the Due Process Clause but failing to provide an exclusion-
ary remedy for state violations); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).  The Court has also long held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the government when it acts in its employer
capacity. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches con-
ducted by the Government, even when the Government acts as an employer . . . .”);
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Individuals do
not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government
instead of a private employer.”).
5 See Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J.
175, 176 (1995) (“[P]ublic sector employees enjoy greater explicit protection of their
privacy rights than private sector employees do.”).
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW ch. 7, intro. note (Council Draft No. 6,
2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_Law_CD6_online.pdf
(“[Chapter 7] concerns the protections afforded through the common law to
employee privacy and autonomy interests that supplement constitutional, statutory
and regulatory protections accorded those interests.”).
7 For example, the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) protects employ-
ees and prospective employees from criminal background checks conducted by third-
party agencies.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006). See Lewis v. Ohio Prof’l Elec. Net-
work, L.L.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (applying the FCRA and analyz-
ing its applicability to specific circumstances).  As far as state law, an increasing
number of states have off-duty conduct statutes that protect lawful employee activities
outside of work. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01–03 (2011); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009).
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more likely that government employers will utilize technologically
advanced methods to intrude upon their employees’ workplace pri-
vacy interests.8  The second development is the recent decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon,9 validating the use by
government employers of some of these very same technological
methods to invade public employees’ privacy interests.
In Quon, a SWAT officer for the City of Ontario in California
alleged Fourth Amendment privacy violations in relation to a police
department’s audit of text messages sent to and from his work
pager.10  The City discovered that the officer had been using the
pager for non-work-related purposes and that some of the messages
were sexually explicit.11  As a result of the investigation, the officer was
found to have violated city work rules and allegedly disciplined.12
Writing for a unanimous Court,13 Justice Kennedy maintained
that even if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his employer-provided pager, the City’s search of the pager was rea-
sonable under two possible legal tests.14  First, under the plurality test
enunciated in O’Connor v. Ortega,15 it was reasonable because it was
motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive
8 See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 254, 259 (2011) (“[A]s scientific and technological advances make their way into
the government’s investigative arsenal, the frequency and scope of administrative
searches will only expand.”); see also Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 786 N.W.2d 177,
208 (Wis. 2010) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“During the last several decades, techno-
logical advancements have revolutionized document storage and electronic
communication.”).
9 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
10 Id. at 2625–26.  The officer also sued the wireless company that turned over
the text messages to the city under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–12 (2006). Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.  Those claims were not considered by
the Supreme Court, id. at 2627, and are, in any event, beyond the scope of this
Article.
11 Id. at 2626 (“Quon sent or received 456 messages during work hours in the
month of August 2002, of which no more than 57 were work related . . . .”).
12 Id.
13 Although a unanimous decision on the merits, Justices Stevens and Scalia con-
curred separately.  Justice Stevens wrote to observe that the majority opinion in Quon
had appropriately punted on the issue of the standard for determining when public
employees should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace context.
See id. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia concurred to criticize the
majority for addressing issues not necessary to decide the case and to state his contin-
ued adherence to the approach he outlined in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987) (plurality opinion). See id. at 2634–35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
14 Id. at 2628–29 (majority opinion).
15 O’Connor, 480 U.S. 709.
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in scope.16  Second, under the test outlined by Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion in that same case, it was reasonable because it
would be considered “reasonable and normal” in the private-sector
workplace.17
Significantly, the Court in Quon looks to cues from the private
sector to determine the appropriate level of privacy protection in pub-
lic-sector employment.18  Not only is Justice Scalia’s proposed test
expressly based on a comparison of privacy interests in the private and
public workplaces, but even the plurality borrowed concepts from the
private sector to develop its operational realities test.19  But rather
than elevating private-sector privacy rights to the public-sector level,
Quon suggests that public employee workplace privacy rights should
be “privatized” and reduced to the level of employees in the private
sector.
This Article maintains that the equalization of privacy rights in
the public and private sector down to the level of the private sector is
mistaken.  Normatively, public employees should have stronger work-
place privacy rights in their physical and electronic workplace loca-
tions than their private-sector counterparts for at least three reasons.
First, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution textually
requires such a distinction.20  Second, and relatedly, the government
employer has substantially more power over its employees than private
16 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631.  More specifically, the two-step plurality test enunci-
ated in O’Connor, requires consideration of whether under the operational realities of
the workplace the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy and if so,
whether the employer’s intrusion upon that expectation “for noninvestigatory, work-
related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct [was reason-
able] . . . under all the circumstances.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26.
17 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632–33.  Under this test, Justice Scalia, would generally
presume that government employees’ offices are covered by the Fourth Amendment
and hold that searches to “retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations
of workplace rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal
in the private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18 The “privatization” of workplace privacy law in Quon does not appear to be
limited to Quon alone.  In another recent privacy case, the Court indicated in the
informational privacy context that it was also looking to the private sector for appro-
priate legal standards. See NASA. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2011) (“The reasona-
bleness of such open-ended [background] questions is illustrated by their
pervasiveness in the public and private sectors.”).
19 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion) (“Public employees’ expecta-
tions of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employ-
ees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation.” (emphasis added)).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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corporations do.21  Third, public employees function as the eyes and
ears of the citizenry to help keep government free from waste, abuse,
fraud, and corruption and, consequently, to insure government
accountability and transparency.22
To reestablish greater workplace privacy protections for public
employees, this Article proposes that the Court adopt a new, two-step
approach for workplace searches in the public sector.  First, a court
should determine for what purpose the workplace search is con-
ducted.  If the search is for routine and noninvestigatory purposes, a
search warrant should not be required and the court should apply the
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment.23  Under the
special needs test, the court should determine whether the employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the search was
legitimate in its inception and scope.24  On the other hand, if a public
employer undertakes the search to investigate employee misconduct,
the public employer should be required to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause, unless the employer can prove that “the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search,”25 or that a state public record law requires the
documents in question to be disclosed.26
21 See generally Grodin, supra note 1, at 13–15 (comparing the rights enjoyed by
private employees with those of public employees).
22 As discussed in more detail below, a similar dynamic of diminishing public
employee free speech rights is at play in the First Amendment and Equal Protection
contexts as a result of the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006),
which eliminated public employee free speech protections under the First Amend-
ment when an employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties. See Engquist v.
Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 610 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In Garcetti, the
Court created a new substantive rule excepting a category of speech by state employ-
ees from the protection of the First Amendment.  Today, the Court creates a new
substantive rule excepting state employees from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-
tion against unequal and irrational treatment at the hands of the State.”).  Yet, as
elaborated on below, there are reasons, based on the text and the structure of the Bill
of Rights, to provide more protection for privacy rights than free speech rights in the
public employment context. See infra Part IV.D.
23 This “special needs test” derives from existing Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010) (“A majority of the
Court further agreed that ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment,’ make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable for govern-
ment employers.” (citations omitted) (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725 (plurality
opinion))); O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–726 (plurality opinion).
25 Id. at 720 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
26 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting public employer investigation into text
messages might be justified in compliance with state open records laws).
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This Article discusses the impact of technological workplace inno-
vation on the privacy rights of public employees in four parts.  Part I
discusses the evolving law of workplace privacy in the public sector.
Part II considers recent developments in the workplace privacy law in
the private sector, with emphasis on the newly-drafted Chapter 7 of
the Restatement of Employment Law.  Part III contends that, post-Quon,
public-sector employee workplace privacy rights have been reduced to
the private-sector level and maintains that public employees should
have stronger privacy protections than their private-sector counter-
parts for textual and prudential reasons.  Part IV concludes by propos-
ing a novel, two-step approach to public workplace searches, based on
the reason for the search.  The hope is that this bifurcated approach
to workplace searches by the government will reestablish greater work-
place privacy protections for public-sector employees and that they
will then be better able to play their crucial government watchdog
role.
I. WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Essentially, there are two major U.S. Supreme Court workplace
privacy cases involving physical or electronic location searches in the
public workplace.27  Neither of these cases, O’Connor v. Ortega or the
more recent case of City of Ontario v. Quon, provides a singular test for
either what constitutes a reasonable expectation of employee privacy
or what constitutes a reasonable employer search.
A. O’Connor v. Ortega
The Court first examined public employees’ rights to privacy at
work in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega.  Although the Court had
previously held that private-sector employees could have reasonable
expectations of privacy in their workplaces under the Fourth Amend-
ment when the police searched their offices,28 questions remained as
to: (1) whether a protectable privacy interest existed when a public
employer searched an employee’s office, desk, and file cabinets; and
(2) whether a warrant based on probable cause was necessary to make
the search constitutionally reasonable.
27 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 720 (“There is surprisingly little case law on the
appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a public employer’s
work-related search of its employee’s offices, desks, or file cabinets.”).
28 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (finding a warrantless search of an
office in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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In O’Connor, Dr. Ortega was the Chief of Professional Education
for psychiatry residents at a California state hospital.29  After being
placed on administrative leave for alleged improprieties, hospital offi-
cials thoroughly searched his office, desk, file cabinets, and papers,
and subsequently seized personal items without his consent.30  Dr.
Ortega alleged in the subsequent lawsuit that this invasion of his office
and personal effects constituted an unconstitutional search and
seizure.31  Although the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to the
public workplace,32 the Justices diverged over what the applicable test
should be and whether Ortega had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the office itself.33
According to the plurality decision written by Justice O’Connor,
in deciding whether public employees have privacy protections at the
workplace, a court should first decide whether the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their office or personal effects
based on the “operational realities of the workplace.”34  Thus,
“[p]ublic employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks,
and file cabinets . . . may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices
and procedures, or by legitimate regulation,”35 and, therefore,
“whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must
be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”36  The upshot is that govern-
ment employees have reduced expectations of privacy or no expecta-
tion of privacy at all, depending on whether the public employer has
promulgated the necessary anti-privacy policies.37  Indeed, the lower
29 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 712 (plurality opinion).
30 Id. at 713.
31 Id. at 714.
32 Id. at 717 (“[W]e reject the contention . . . that public employees can never
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work. Individuals do not
lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead
of a private employer.”).
33 Id. at 718–19.
34 Id. at 717 (“The operational realities of the workplace . . . may make some
employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor
rather than a law enforcement official.”).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 718.
37 Many have criticized this test as being too employer friendly. See, e.g., Marissa
A. Lalli, Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for a New
Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 246 (2011) (arguing that “lower
courts’ application of [O’Connor’s] . . . operational realities of the workplace test
vests a dangerous amount of discretion in government employers”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Others believe the test is tantamount to a highly-deferential
rational basis review analysis. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
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federal court cases, applying the plurality test from O’Connor, “indi-
cate that the government employer alone determines an employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.”38
If a court finds that the employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the plurality next would have courts apply a “special needs”
analysis for both legitimate work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions
and investigations for work-related misconduct.39  The plurality con-
cluded that it was not necessary to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause, because it would be impracticable for the government
employer to obtain a warrant in this context.40  Such searches are
instead judged on “reasonableness under all the circumstances,”41
which in turn balances “the invasion of the employees’ legitimate
expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision,
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”42  Finally, the
reasonableness of the employer search is judged from the perspective
of whether the search was reasonable in its inception and in its
scope.43
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia commented that he
would have generally presumed that governmental employees’ offices,
and the personal items therein, are covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment.44  Rather than employ an ad-hoc inquiry based on reasonable-
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (“[J]udgments couched in terms of ‘rea-
sonableness’ slide very easily into the familiar constitutional rubric of ‘rational basis’
review . . . .”); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992) (“The Supreme Court’s generalized ‘rea-
sonableness’ standard resembles not negligence, but rational-basis constitutional
review . . . .”).
38 See Lalli, supra note 37, at 258.
39 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion) (finding the “special needs” of
public employers may override the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment).
40 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010) (quoting O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 725) (plurality opinion)) (“A majority of the Court further agreed that
‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,’ make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable for government employers.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice
Blackmun’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, would have found Dr. Ortega had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets, and would
have found that public employment does not constitute a “special needs” circum-
stance and, therefore, a warrant based on a probable cause should have been
required. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732–33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26 (plurality opinion).
42 Id. at 719–20.
43 Id. at 726.
44 Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Scalia’s prefer-
ence for such an approach is based on his objection “to the formulation of a standard
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ness as the plurality did, he would hold that “searches to retrieve work-
related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—
searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the
private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”45
Justice Scalia’s legal framework would therefore treat privacy rights in
the public workplace the same as privacy rights in the private
workplace.
The difference in how these two legal tests in O’Connor incorpo-
rate private-sector privacy notions is a difference of degree rather than
a difference in kind, as both opinions end up equating public and
private sector workplace privacy rights.  Indeed, many courts post-
O’Connor largely ignored Justice Scalia’s test, believing that the two
tests amounted to much the same thing.46  Whereas Justice Scalia
relies on notions of privacy in the private sector to determine the rea-
sonableness of the government employer’s search, the plurality’s reli-
ance on the private sector takes place in determining whether the
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place.47
Nevertheless, under both tests, private sector conceptions of work-
place privacy influence whether the public-sector employee is found
to have a cognizable workplace privacy interest.
In the end, a majority of Justices in O’Connor agreed that Dr.
Ortega had at least a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office,
desk, and file cabinets.48  Yet, the Court remanded the case to deter-
mine, given the employer’s interests, whether the scope of the intru-
so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty . . . .” Id. at
730.
45 Id. at 732; see also Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the application of the “standardless and
unsupported” operational realities test).  In other words, Justice Scalia would prefer a
bright-line rule in these cases as opposed to balancing interests of employees and the
government or applying legal standards that are hard to capture.  This approach is
very much consistent with his jurisprudence in other areas of the law. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 28 (1997) (identifying Justice Scalia as “perhaps the leading contemporary cham-
pion of rules over more loosely defined standards and especially over multi-factor
balancing tests.”).
46 See, e.g., Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1203–4 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying
O’Connor plurality standard and maintaining that Justice Scalia did not seem to supply
an alternative legal test).
47 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717–18 (plurality opinion).
48 Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion recognizes as much. See id. at 718
(“The Court of Appeals concluded that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, and five Members of this Court agree with that determination.”).
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sion was reasonable.49 O’Connor thus stands for the proposition that
public employees may be able to claim workplace privacy interests
under the Fourth Amendment but that protection is narrower in
scope than the Fourth Amendment protections citizens generally
enjoy against the government.50  This is because, like private employ-
ers, public employers also “have an interest in ensuring employee pro-
ductivity, data security, patent and trademark protection, and quality
customer relations.”51  Additionally, employers must act to work to
“preserv[e] evidence for potential litigation, minimiz[e] behavior that
may create a hostile work environment, and ensur[e] their communi-
cations systems are secure, stable, and free of harmful viruses and pro-
grams.”52  These efficiency interests of private and public employers in
the privacy context are in fact very much like the same interests
described in the Pickering line of public employee free speech cases
under the First Amendment and in the “class of one” equal protection
claims in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture.53  And as Pauline
Kim has commented, all of these cases, and O’Connor, “focus attention
on the government’s role as employer, losing sight of the fact that this
employer is also the government.”54
As far as the O’Connor decision itself, because it did not contain a
majority opinion, the legal standard for workplace searches of public
employees’ offices and personal property remained an open question.
After O’Connor, lower federal courts have generally applied the opera-
49 Id. at 729.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that the scope of the search of
Ortega’s office was unreasonable. See Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th
Cir. 1998).
50 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26 (plurality opinion); id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (requiring no warrant or showing of probable cause for warrantless searches
because “‘special needs’ are present in the context of government employment.”).
51 Justin Holbrook, Communications Privacy in the Military, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
831, 861 (2010). See Lawrence A. Edell, A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Is a Govern-
ment E-mail Account the Equivalent of a Wall Locker in a Barracks Room?, 2008 ARMY LAW 1,
2 (2008).
52 Holbrook, supra note 51, at 861. See Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between
Employer Business Interests and Employee Privacy: Using Respondeat Superior to Justify the
Monitoring of Web-Based, Personal Electronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace, 7
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH J. 273, 278 (2003).
53 553 U.S. 591 (2008).  The free speech line of cases includes: Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See generally Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 907, 939–41 (2011) (discussing the adverse impact of recent U.S. Supreme
Court’s approach on public employee free speech rights).
54 See Pauline T. Kim, Constitutional Rights at Work: Speech and Privacy 11 (emphasis
in original) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
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tional realities test of the plurality to diminish or eliminate the work-
place privacy expectations of public workers, while emphasizing the
efficiency interests of employers.55
B. City of Ontario v. Quon
For twenty-three years, Ortega v. O’Connor remained the primary,
albeit ambiguous, legal standard for workplace privacy claims in the
public sector under the Fourth Amendment.  In 2009, the U.S.
Supreme Court took certiorari in the case of City of Ontario v. Quon.
The case concerned the scope of privacy rights a city SWAT officer
had in text messages he sent on his employer-provided pager.56
In Quon, the City of Ontario issued pagers, capable of receiving
and sending text messages, to its SWAT officers so that the unit could
easily communicate and mobilize during crisis situations.57  The City,
through its wireless provider, Arch Wireless Operating Company, lim-
ited the number of texts that could be sent or received in a given
month, and excess usage resulted in additional fees being incurred.58
The City had a “Computer Usage, Internet, and E-mail Policy” that
expressly limited the expectation of privacy of employees in city-
owned technology,59 and Sergeant Quon acknowledged in writing
55 See Lalli, supra note 37, at 255–69 (collecting cases to establish that lower
courts post-O’Connor have applied the operational realities test to generally diminish
public employee workplace privacy protections).
56 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010) (plurality opinion).  The
fact that the pager in question was owned by the employer was not dispositive as the
Court had previously held that employees could have expectations of privacy in work
spaces they did not own. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (noting
the “capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon
a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom . . . .”); see also O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 740 n.7 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This Court . . . has made it
clear that privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment do not turn on own-
ership of particular premises.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), and
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967))).
57 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
58 Id.
59 Id. (“[The Computer Policy] specified that the City ‘reserves the right to moni-
tor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without
notice.  Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using
these resources.’” (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 152a)).
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receiving this policy.60  Yet, the parties agreed that this policy did not
apply expressly to text messaging.61
Instead, the City orally told its SWAT team members that the text
messages on the pagers would be treated the same way as emails and
then put its oral statements in a written memorandum.62  When Quon
later discovered that he was exceeding the usage limits, he was assured
by his supervisor that the City did not intend to audit employees’ text
messages, and permitted Quon to pay the City directly for his exces-
sive usage.63
Despite the supervisor’s statement that the City did not intend to
audit employees’ text messages, the City did in fact audit them.  The
City claimed that it wanted to determine whether the usage limit it
had established was too low and whether the overages were because of
professional usage or personal usage of the pagers.64  The City there-
fore requested from Arch Wireless transcripts of text messages for a
couple of months for employees like Quon who had exceeded their
usage limit during a specified period.65
Upon reviewing the transcripts sent by Arch Wireless, Quon’s
supervisor discovered that most of the messages sent by Quon were of
a personal nature and some were sexually explicit.66  Based on this
information, Quon was investigated by the police department’s inter-
nal affairs division to determine whether Quon had violated work
rules by pursuing personal matters while on duty.67  The investigation
revealed that even if one solely looked at text messages sent by Quon
during work hours, only a little more than ten percent of the remain-
ing messages were work-related.68  Based on this violation of work
rules, Quon claims he was disciplined.69
The Supreme Court reviewed Quon’s claims that the City’s han-
dling of his text messages constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Importantly, during trial, the
60 Id.
61 Id. The Court pointed out that e-mails and text messages differ in that text
messages do not pass through computers owned by the City, but rather are routed
through Arch Wireless’s computer network. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. The same policy was utilized for other members of the SWAT team that
exceeded their usage limit on the pager. Id.





69 Id. It is unclear from the record whether, in fact, Officer Quon suffered
discipline.
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jury determined that the purpose of the City’s audit was noninvesti-
gatory and only undertaken to determine whether the usage limit for
the pagers was sufficient.70  The audit was not done to investigate
Quon for workplace misconduct.71
Although the hope was that the Court would determine once and
for all the appropriate legal analysis for such workplace privacy claims,
the Court instead wrote an opinion in the City’s favor which only fur-
ther confused matters and satisfied neither side.  All the Justices
agreed arguendo that the Fourth Amendment applied to the audit of
the text messages.72  Yet, the Court did not decide formally whether
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages73
and did not decide the appropriate test for determining the reasona-
bleness of the search in light of those privacy expectations.
As to the question of whether Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his employer-provided pager, the Court declined to
choose between the “operational realities” test of the plurality in
O’Connor and the presumption adopted by Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence that offices (and impliedly other physical and electronic loca-
tions in such offices) are normally covered by Fourth Amendment
protections.  Rather, the Court assumed for the sake of argument74
70 Id. at 2631.
71 Id. at 2627.  Although this jury determination did not make a difference to the
outcome in Quon, this distinction is crucial to the proposed workplace privacy test
below, which depends in part on the investigatory or noninvestigatory purpose of the
public employer’s search. See infra Part IV.  As will be discussed, the distinction
between investigatory and non-investigatory searches turns on the purpose of the
search at the time the search is initiated.  Searches commenced to uncover workplace
misconduct by an employee are presumptively investigatory.
72 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
73 Id. (“Even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages, petitioners did not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining
and reviewing the transcripts.”).
74 Id.  The Court took this same approach in another recent employment privacy
case, NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“We assume, without deciding, that
the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and
Nixon.”).  That privacy right, not discussed herein, involves the privacy “interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters” under the substantive component of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977); Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457
(1977)); see also Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]he right to informational privacy emerged from the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, [and] counsel invoked the infinitely plastic concept of ‘substan-
tive’ due process.”).  The Fourth Amendment did not apply to the informational pri-
vacy interests in Nelson because the background employment inquiries to third parties
in that case “were not Fourth Amendment ‘searches’ under United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976) . . . [and] the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the Government
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that Quon did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, since the out-
come of the case would still come out in favor of the City, regardless
of which reasonableness test was applied.75
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion examined a
number of factors that could potentially play a role in determining
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy.76  For
instance, Kennedy tantalizingly wonders whether the increased use of
smart phones and other devices means that employees will have more
or less privacy in such devices.77  Having noted the potential relevant
issues, the Court punts, maintaining that it “would have difficultly pre-
dicting how employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped by [evolv-
ing technology] or the degree to which society will be prepared to
recognize those expectations as reasonable.”78
from asking questions about private information.” Id. at 765. But see United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary
to reconsider the premise than an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” (citation omitted)).
75 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628–29.  The unwillingness of the Court to weigh in on the
reasonableness of Quon’s expectation of privacy can probably be explained by a fac-
tual dispute in the record that had not been determined by the jury.  Although it was
clear that Quon had been told by superiors that the text messages would be treated
like emails and could be audited, there was also evidence that this policy had been
overridden by subsequent comments by Quon’s supervisor that the City did not
intend to audit employee text messages. Id. at 2629.  Applying the “operational reali-
ties” test of the O’Connor plurality, additional factual questions remained, including:
(1) did the supervisor have the authority to change the policy; and (2) could text
messages be reviewed for purposes of performance evaluations, litigation against the
police department, or because of open records requests. Id.  In any event, this unset-
tled state of the record appears to have made it difficult to determine whether Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy and, rather than remand the case for further
factual findings, the Court appears to have chosen to assume the privacy expectation
existed and to decide the case for the City based on the reasonableness of its search.
76 This discussion by Justice Kennedy infuriated Justice Scalia. See id. at 2634–35
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court . . . inex-
plicably interrupts its analysis with a recitation of the parties’ arguments concerning,
and an excursus on the complexity and consequences of answering, that admittedly
irrelevant threshold question. That discussion is unnecessary.” (citations omitted)).
77 Id. at 2630 (majority opinion).
78 Id.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (noting
“[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations
are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes,”
when it comes to what amounts to a reasonable expectation of privacy.).  There is also
the recurring problem that “judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of pri-
vacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person.” Id. (citing Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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As far as the test for whether the search of Quon’s text messages
was reasonable, the Court applied both the plurality test based on
“reasonableness under all the circumstances”79 and Justice Scalia’s test
that approved of public employee searches that would be “reasonable
and normal in the private-employer context”80  In the end, however,
the Quon majority does not pick a particular test because the City
prevails under either test.81
The problem with this state of affairs in the workplace privacy
context, post-Quon, is that inevitably a case will again come along
which will require a determination of whether an employee has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in electronic equipment provided by
their government employer.82  Moreover, what should be done in
future cases where a search is reasonable under the plurality’s test in
O’Connor, but not under Scalia’s test in O’Connor, or vice versa?83
Does the plurality test trump because it received four votes and was
applied approvingly in Quon, or does Scalia’s test apply because he
was the fifth vote in O’Connor and his opinion can be seen as the most
narrow one upon which a majority of Justices agreed?84
79 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2629.
82 See Lalli, supra note 37, at 245–46 (“The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
adapt the outdated [O’Connor] test to ‘the new generation of communications tech-
nology’ when it decided Quon.  Instead, the Court sidestepped the most important
question regarding employee privacy rights in electronic communications.” (footnote
omitted)).  In fact, lower court cases since Quon have not identified such a case yet.
See, e.g., True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676, 680–82 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing both tests,
but applying only plurality test); Carter v. County of L.A., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[T]he court concludes that because of the constant and non-dis-
criminating nature of the surveillance, and because it occurred in a semi-private area
where employees had to perform non-work activities (like eating and taking breaks),
under either Justice Scalia’s O’Connor test or the O’Connor plurality test, the video
surveillance was unreasonable and in violation of [plaintiffs’] Fourth Amendment
rights.”).  In fact, at least one recent case post-Quon did not even mention Scalia’s
alternative test in its Fourth Amendment workplace privacy analysis. See Jones v.
Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 816 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
83 For instance, one could imagine a public workplace search excessive in scope
under the plurality test, but considered to be reasonable and normal in the private
sector under Justice Scalia’s approach.
84 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“There is room for reasonable debate as to which of the two
approaches advocated by Justices whose votes supported the judgment in O’Connor—
the plurality’s and mine—is controlling under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977).”); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor is a plurality decision, and it is difficult
to identify ‘that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on
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Regardless, the argument here is that whether a court applies the
plurality’s or Scalia’s workplace privacy test, both tests essentially hold
that a public employee search is reasonable as long as it would be
reasonable in the private sector.85  Justice Scalia would expressly look
at what would be reasonable and normal in the private workplace for
his test.86  But even the plurality’s approach considers what would be
considered acceptable in the private workplace.  In this regard, Justice
O’Connor writes for the plurality that “[p]ublic employees’ expecta-
tions of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of
actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”87
Perhaps most significantly, Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in
Quon explicitly twins the plurality and Justice Scalia’s tests by stating:
For these same reasons [that make the search reasonable under the
plurality’s test]—that the employer had a legitimate reason for the
search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of
that justification—the Court also concludes that the search would
be “regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employment
context” and would satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence [in O’Connor].88
the narrowest grounds.’” (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193)); Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d
1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989) (assuming the plurality test of O’Connor should be applied
because it is the least-common-denominator holding).
85 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.  A similar convergence of public
and private employee privacy rights appears to be occurring in a number of countries
in Western Europe as well. See Alexander De Becker, The Legal Status of Public Employ-
ees or Public Servants: Comparing the Regulatory Frameworks in the United Kingdom, France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 949, 951 (2011) (“In each
country [studied], some convergent tendencies between employment regulation in
the public and private sectors can be found.”).
86 Justice Scalia also makes clear in his concurrence in Quon that his views since
O’Connor have not changed, and that “the proper threshold inquiry should be not
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employees’ employer-
issued pagers, but whether it applies in general to such messages on employer-issued
pagers.” Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
87 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added).  “[A]t least three (and probably many more) factors diminish subjective pri-
vacy expectations in workplace electronic communications: the public nature of work
environments, the technical oversight of network administrators, and the ubiquity of
employee notices in handbooks, user agreements, and logon banners.” See Holbrook,
supra note 51, at 832 (footnote omitted).
88 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (majority opinion) (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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In short, rather than public employees being subject to a more
searching inquiry when their privacy rights are implicated in the work-
place, both the plurality and Scalia’s test seek to reduce public
employee privacy rights to the level of private employees under the
common law of tort.  Post-Quon, privacy rights of public employees
and private employees are being discussed interchangeably.89  Of
course, it is impossible at this point to say whether this is a troubling
development from a normative standpoint until we explore the nature
of workplace privacy rights in the private sector.
II. WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
To determine the relative level of workplace privacy rights for pri-
vate sector employees, this part is divided into two sections.  The first
section explains which of these workplace privacy rights should be
compared to the public sector privacy rights discussed above.  The sec-
ond section analyzes the applicable sections of Chapter 7 of the
Restatement of Employment Law to determine the relative strength of
these common law workplace privacy rights to those existing in the
public sector under the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Scope of the Common Law of Workplace Privacy
The appropriate historic analog in the common law context to
searches of physical and electronic locations in the workplace is the
intrusion upon seclusion tort fashioned by Dean Prosser in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.90  This intrusion tort required a showing that the
employer intruded into a physical location where the employee had a
89 As Justice Blackmun points out in dissent in O’Connor, this might mean that
there are few situations where a public employer’s search, whether routine or investi-
gatory, will not be considered reasonable under the plurality’s standard. See O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun goes even further: “It
could be argued that the plurality removes its analysis from the facts of this case in
order to arrive at a result unfavorable to public employees, whose position members
of the plurality do not look upon with much sympathy.” Id. at 734 n.3.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965).  The other privacy torts—
false light, public disclosure of private facts, and misappropriation of name or like-
ness—are beyond the scope of this Article.
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reasonable expectation of privacy91 and such an intrusion also had to
be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”92
The current version of Chapter 7 of the Restatement (Third) of
Employment Law takes a different approach.93  First, it combined
employee privacy and autonomy interests.  Whereas the “interest in
privacy refers to what has been called the ‘right to be left alone,’ the
right to keep certain areas and activities free from intrusion by
others,” the “interest in personal autonomy covers activities that may
not be private but are considered so much a part of the individual’s
personality that they deserve a level of protection against outside
interference.”94  This Article addresses employee privacy interests (dis-
cussed in Sections 7.01–7.07),95 not autonomy interests (discussed in
Sections 7.08–7.09).96
91 As the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law observes, the concept of a “reason-
able expectation of privacy” is common to both workplace privacy analyses in the
public and private sectors. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY &
AUTONOMY § 7.01 cmt. f (Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.
ali.org/docs/Employment_Law_CD6_online.pdf (“[C]ourts have utilized Fourth
Amendment principles in deciding whether employees generally, whether they work
for the government or for private company, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their offices.”). But see id. § 7.03 Reporter’s Notes, cmt. e (“[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence on reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be automatically
transposed into the area of workplace intrusions.”).
92 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citations omitted);
K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 632 (Tex. App. 1984).  Forty-
one states and the District of Columbia apply some version of the intrusion upon
seclusion tort. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY
§ 7.01 Reporter’s Notes, cmt. b (Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://
extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_Law_CD6_online.pdf.
93 This Article relies on Council Draft No. 6 for the current iteration of Chapter 7
of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law.  Because the American Law Institute has
not yet adopted Chapter 7, it should be expected that aspects of this Chapter will
change before being adopted.  Yet, the current version is utilized here to provide an
analogous structure for comparing the intrusion upon seclusion tort with workplace
privacy law under the Fourth Amendment.
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY ch. 7, intro-
ductory note (Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/
Employment_Law_CD6_online.pdf.  This dichotomy is based on the distinction made
in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (“One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions.”).
95 Section 7.07, however, is beyond the scope of this Article because it deals with
retaliatory actions taken by employers where an employee refuses to consent to a
wrongful intrusion upon a protected privacy interest.
96 Consequently, issues of sexual privacy under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), grounded in the substantive component of the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment (primarily discussed in the opinion), are beyond
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Section 7.01 of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law, intro-
ducing the newly-named tort of wrongful employer intrusion upon a
protected employee privacy interest, generally states that
“[e]mployees have a right of privacy against wrongful employer intru-
sions upon protected employee privacy interests.  Protected employee
privacy interests are set out in Section 7.02, and discussed in Sections
7.03–7.05.  The concept of wrongful employer intrusion is discussed
in Section 7.06.”97
Section 7.02 then divides the protected employee private interests
into essentially four categories: (1) the employee’s physical person
and personal functions;98 (2) physical or electronic locations, includ-
ing work locations provided by the employer; (3) the employee’s
information of a personal nature;99 and (4) the non-disclosure to
third parties of employee information of a personal nature disclosed
in confidence to the employer.100
the scope of this Article.  Nevertheless, it can be pointed out briefly here that develop-
ment of autonomy interests in the public sector do appear to have had a positive
influence on similar interests in the private sector in the drafting of Sections 7.08 and
7.09 of the Restatement (subjecting an employer to liability for intruding upon an
employee’s autonomy interest unless that autonomy interest interferes with the
employer’s legitimate business interests), and in the expansion of state off-duty con-
duct statutes. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.5(1) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)
(McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -03 (2009).
97 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.01
(Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf.
98 This category under Section 7.03(a)(1) involves searches involving the drug
testing of employees. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).  This issue is
not discussed in this Article, though such privacy intrusions are also examined under
the Fourth Amendment in the public workplace.
99 This protectable interest, discussed in Section 7.04, concerns information pri-
vacy interests like those discussed in the recent case of NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746
(2011) (upholding background questions of NASA contract employees).  Such infor-
mational privacy rights, to the extent that they exist, are thought to be grounded in
state and federal laws, not the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that “counsel asserted . . . that the right to informational privacy emerged
from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” but “[t]hat counsel invoked
the infinitely plastic concept of ‘substantive’ due process . . . .”).
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.02(c)
(Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf.  This last category, addressed in Section 7.05, is most closely
associated with the tort of public disclosure of private facts and is also beyond the
scope of this Article.
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This Article focuses on Section 7.03(a)(2), the second category,
concerning “physical or electronic locations in which the employee
has a reasonable expectation that the location is private as to that
intrusion.”101  This category “covers those traditional intrusions into
private physical spaces, like bathrooms or lockers, as well as electronic
‘places,’ such as email and text messages . . . .”102  Also, and similar to
Fourth Amendment principles in this regard, just because the
employer owns the premises, furniture, or electronic equipment, does
not necessarily mean that an employee cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those physical or electronic locations.103  It is
because these “most prototypical privacy invasion[s]”104 are most
closely aligned with traditional Fourth Amendment concerns in the
public sector that they are the focus of this discussion of workplace
privacy in the private sector.105
B. Wrongful Intrusions upon Employees’ Protected Privacy Interests in
Physical or Electronic Locations
Section 7.03(b) discusses in detail employee privacy interests in
physical and electronic locations in the workplace.  An employee has
an expectation of privacy in such a location if:
(1) the employer has provided express notice that the location is
private for employees;106 or
(2) the employer has acted in a manner that treats the location as
private for employees, the type of location is customarily treated as
private space for employees, and the employee has made reasonable
efforts to keep the location private.107
For example, the existence of an employee manual with a state-
ment concerning the lack of privacy expectations in electronic com-
101 Id. § 7.03(a)(2).
102 Id. § 7.02 Reporters’ Notes, cmt.
103 Id. § 7.03 cmt. d.
104 Id. § 7.03 Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a.
105 Id. (“There is considerable overlap between this type of invasion of privacy and
the situations that have [been] found to be searches under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
106 The ability of employer policies to reduce privacy expectations of employees in
the private sector works in the same manner that such policies work under the “opera-
tional realities” test of the O’Connor plurality. See supra notes 39–43 and accompany-
ing text.
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.03(b)
(Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf.
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munications could limit the reasonable expectation of privacy.108
Indeed, responding to the potential of tort liability, many private-sec-
tor employers in recent years have added policies to employee hand-
books which make clear that employers control all of these electronic
communications and can monitor them to ensure that such commu-
nications are not being used for improper purposes (e.g., personal
communications or internet pornography).109  Such policies change
the “operational realities” of a workplace, to use the terminology of
the plurality in O’Connor,110 insuring that employees do not develop
reasonable expectations of privacy in these electronic communica-
tions while at work.  However, in the absence of such an express
employer policy concerning electronic communications, employees
may still have an expectation of privacy if the factors set out above in
Section 7.03(b)(2) are met.111
If an employer intrudes upon an employee’s physical or elec-
tronic location in which the employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the question then becomes, under Section 7.06, whether the
intrusion is wrongful.  The intrusion can be wrongful if: “(1) the
employer does not have sufficient business justification for the intru-
sion; or (2) the scope or manner of the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person under the circumstances.”112  Putting
it slightly differently, “[a]n intrusion upon a privacy interest only cre-
ates liability when that intrusion is unreasonable and offensive.”113
An employer does not have a “sufficient business justification for
an intrusion” if the intrusion does not “advance[ ] a substantial, legiti-
mate business interest or an important public interest.”114  The scope
or manner of an intrusion is not “highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son” if “in light of the justification, the employer action meets the
108 Id. at § 7.03 cmt. i (“An employer’s notice regarding the likelihood of
employer intrusions in a work location is often an important factor in determining
whether employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that location. . . . [A]
clear employer notice or policy that a particular location is not private for employees
generally defeats an employee’s expectation of privacy, unless the employer’s actual
practices contravene the wording of an express notice or policy.”).
109 Indeed, this is exactly what the City of Ontario did expressly with regard to
computers, the internet, and email. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2625
(2010) (plurality opinion).
110 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion).
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.03(b)(2)
cmts. d–e (Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/
Employment _Law_CD6_online.pdf.
112 Id. at § 7.06(a).
113 Id. at § 7.06 Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a.
114 Id. at § 7.06(b).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-NOV-12 12:00
2012] privatizing  workplace  privacy 299
generally accepted societal norms for making such an intrusion.”115  It
is important to note that the ways in which employer intrusions can be
wrongful under this section are stated in the disjunctive so that “even
if the intrusion is supported by sufficient business justification, it may
still be actionable if its manner or scope would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person under the circumstances.”116
It would appear then that in applying the “highly offensive” stan-
dard, the common law contains an additional requirement for the
finding of liability for an invasion of privacy in physical or electronic
locations in the workplace.  Whereas the constitutional privacy law for
government employees requires under O’Connor’s plurality test the
finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy and an unreasonable
intrusion into that privacy interest,117 the common law goes a step
further.  It also requires a further finding that the employer’s interfer-
ence with a reasonable expectation of privacy would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person.118  This additional requirement is
significant because as the Restatement points out, this additional show-
ing requires that the “employer action meet[ ] the generally accepted
societal norms for making such an intrusion.”119  In other words, it
puts an additional burden on the employee before he or she can hold
the employer liable for an intrusion of a protected privacy interest in
the workplace.
In this regard, consider how the Restatement legal approach might
apply in the well-known workplace privacy case of K-Mart Corp. Store
No. 7441 v. Trotti.120 Trotti involves a classic on-the-job privacy claim in
the private sector involving a female K-Mart employee who had a
locker at work.121  With her employer’s permission, she had placed a
personal lock on this locker and was not required to give the combina-
tion to her employer.122  Nonetheless, she found one day that her
locker had been opened and her purse inside had been significantly
disturbed.123  Although her manager initially denied going through
115 Id. at § 7.06(c).
116 Id. at § 7.06, cmt. b.
117 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.06 cmt. b
(Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf.
119 Id. at § 7.06(c).
120 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984).
121 Id. at 634.
122 Id. at 634–35.
123 Id. at 635.
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her belongings, he later admitted to looking for stolen goods in her
locker.124
First, the court noted the legal standard for an intrusion upon
seclusion claim: “‘the intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”125  In
analyzing whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the court commented that the employee could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the locker, as the jury found, because even
though the locker was K-Mart’s property, it had permitted the
employee to place her own lock on it.126
The court also found that to avoid turning the privacy tort into a
strict liability offense, it was essential that the plaintiff show that the
intrusion into her locked locker without her permission would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.127  Because the trial court had
not required the jury to consider whether the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, the court remanded the case
for a new trial, but hinted that the female employee would likely be
successful at trial on this point given the facts in the record.128
Applying the Restatement of Employment Law approach to Trotti
would appear to yield the same outcome.  This claim constitutes an
employer intrusion upon a physical location where the employee had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  This expectation of privacy was
based on the fact that: (1) the employer had acted in a manner that
suggested the employee’s locker would remain private; (2) a locker
with one’s own lock on it is the type of location customarily treated as
private space; and (3) the employee made more than reasonable
efforts to keep the location private by keep the locker locked and not
telling her employer the combination.129
The employer intrusion of the employee’s locker was wrongful
because the employer did not have sufficient business justification for
the intrusion as there was no reason to suspect that Trotti had stolen
the items in question.  Second, both the scope and manner of the
124 Id.
125 Id. at 636 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
126 Id. at 638 (“It is sufficient that an employee in this situation, by having placed a
lock on the locker at the employee’s own expense and with the appellants’ consent,
has demonstrated a legitimate expectation to a right of privacy in both the locker
itself and those personal effects within it.”).
127 Id. at 637 (“We hold that the element of a highly offensive intrusion is a funda-
mental part of the definition of an invasion of privacy . . . .”).
128 Id.
129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.03(b)
(Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf.
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intrusion would likely be highly offensive to a reasonable person
under the circumstances because of the manner in which the
employee’s supervisor forced open her locker and because of the per-
sonal nature of the items which were rifled through in her locker by
her supervisor.130  The intrusion would likely be considered “highly
offensive” under the circumstances because in light of the justification
for the search advanced by her employer, the employer’s action did
not meet generally accepted societal norms for making such an intru-
sion.131  Indeed, the evidence which the employer in Trotti sought
could have been obtained in less intrusive ways, including by merely
questioning all employees about the whereabouts of the missing
items.  Finally, the use of deception in effectuating the intrusion in
Trotti by first denying responsibility for the search “is particularly ques-
tionable” and does not seem “justified by legitimate business reasons
[or] in line with the practices of other employers in like
circumstances.”132
Based on all of these reasons, then, it appears that the Fourth
Amendment’s “unreasonable” standard requires a higher level of scru-
tiny than the “highly offensive” approach in both the Restatement of
Torts and Restatement of Employment Law.133  Theoretically, at least,
there would seem to be intrusions by employers into employees’ pro-
tected privacy interests that are sanctionable under the Fourth
Amendment that would not be sanctionable in the private sector
workplace under the “highly offensive to reasonable person” stan-
dard.134  Private-sector workplace privacy standards would then supply
130 Id. § 7.06 cmt. d (“‘Manner’ refers to the means that the employer uses in
effecting the intrusion.  ‘Scope’ refers to the extensiveness or breadth of the
intrusion.”).
131 In this regard, the Trotti court commented that “[t]he mere suspicion either
that another employee had stolen watches, or that unidentified employees may have
stolen price-marking guns was insufficient to justify the appellants’ search of appel-
lee’s locker and personal possessions without her consent.  The record also demon-
strates that the appellants lied to appellee and concealed the truth of their wrongful
search for approximately one month.” Trotti, 677 S.W.2d at 640.
132 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW: EMP’T PRIVACY & AUTONOMY § 7.06 illus.
8 (Council Draft No. 6, 2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/Employment_
Law_CD6_online.pdf; see also Trotti, 677 S.W.2d at 641 (“The appellants clearly made
this wrongful intrusion with neither the appellee’s permission nor justifiable suspi-
cion that the appellee had stolen any store inventory.”).
133 That being said, I argue below that even a higher level of scrutiny should be
adopted under the Fourth Amendment when public employers seek evidence from
searches to take adverse employment action against their employees. See infra Part
IV.D.
134 This point is a hard point to prove in practice, because workplace privacy cases
are either decided under the common law or constitutional law, but generally not
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less protection to employees than constitutional standards.  Thus, to
the extent that the Justices in Quon based their decisions about public
employees’ expectations of privacy and the reasonableness of public
employers’ search on private-sector conceptions of workplace privacy
rights, constitutional standards have been deployed to counter-intui-
tively decrease the level of privacy protections for public-sector
workers.
The next Part maintains, as a normative matter, that public-sector
workers should be entitled to greater levels of privacy protections in
the workplace based on textual and prudential considerations.  This
Article then concludes in the final Part by arguing for a new, two-step
workplace privacy analysis which seeks to contextualize workplace
searches and then applies presumptively the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant and probable cause requirements to those searches under-
taken for investigatory purposes in the public workplace.
III. DISTINGUISHING WORKPLACE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
As illustrated above, post-Quon, public and private employees
have been deemed to have the same level of workplace privacy rights.
Further, because the Restatement approach in the private sector is less
privacy protective than the constitutional balancing approach in the
public sector, the upshot is that public-sector workplace privacy rights
have been diminished to the level of private-sector workplace privacy
rights.
This Part contends that public-sector employees should have a
greater expectation of privacy in the workplace than their private-sec-
tor counterparts for three reasons: (1) the text of the constitution; (2)
the power of the government as employer; and (3) the critical over-
sight role public employees undertake in American representative
democracy.135
both. But see Carter v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(applying both private-sector and public-sector tests and coming to same finding of
unreasonable employer intrusion in secret video surveillance case).
135 All of this is not to denigrate “the critical role that public-sector litigation has
played in the development of the common law.”  Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 616; see
also De Becker, supra note 85, at 949–50 (“[I]t is commonly recognized that the role
of the State as employer demands for certain ad hoc regulation derived essentially
from private employment law.”).
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A. The Text of the Constitution and the State Action Doctrine
Private employees are treated differently from public employees
because, under the state action doctrine, the federal constitution only
applies to intrusions by public employers.136  People might disagree
on whether there is a sustainable distinction between private conduct
and public conduct,137 but the theory behind the state action doctrine
is that actions by the state are the primary concern of constitutional
prohibition because of the power of the state in relation to the power
of a private actor.138
But even further, and as Richard Kay aptly observes, most people
have an intuition that there is something special about constitutional
law: “That intuition is the idea that the rules of the Constitution make
up a separate and exceptional body of law with its own subject matter
and its own limits.”139  This exceptional body of law is not merely con-
cerned with whether a particular intrusion by a given employer
offends some notion of appropriate conduct in the workplace.
Rather, constitutional law is about bigger issues, like the appropriate
balance between liberty and order in a representative democracy.140
Or to place this discussion more directly into the workplace context,
the question of under what circumstances should government
136 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
137 Scholars hold differing views on how this public-private distinction should be
made. See generally Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinc-
tion, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
101 (2004) (arguing against the formalism of the public-private distinction because it
interferes with personal integrity, including the First Amendment rights of individu-
als); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1041 (1987)
(explaining that Carolene Products compromise does not explain what is actually hap-
pening in Supreme Court rulings); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Tam-
ing of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 967–68 (1989) (“[U]nder the discriminatory
intent test, the question in ‘state action’ cases is no longer whether the state is acting
but whether the state’s action—whatever it is—is tainted by discriminatory intent.”).
138 See Kay, supra note 2, at 329–30.  The relative power of the government as
employer compared to the power of private employers over its employees is discussed
infra Part III.B.
139 Kay, supra note 2, at 337.
140 Id. at 339 (“Modern interpretations of the rules of the Constitution do not
specify narrowly defined duties and prohibitions.  They declare general standards of
conduct.”); see also Primus, supra note 8, at 259 (“The specter of additional terrorist
attacks means that we should expect the courts to confront even more government
intrusions in the name of safety and security in the future.”).
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employers have the ability to conduct workplace searches to provide a
more efficient and effective government for the good of society.141
So whereas under tort law we require a court to ask whether an
employer’s unjustified invasion of its employee’s privacy interests
would be “highly offensive” to a reasonable person, we only require a
balancing of government and individual interests in the Fourth
Amendment context.142  This constitutional balancing of interests is
consistent with “[t]he central paradigm for modern constitutional
law[,] . . . the process of balancing the individual injury complained of
against the social benefits from the state’s action.”143
B. The Power of the State as Employer
Not only should public employees have greater privacy rights
because the text of the Fourth Amendment provides more protection
against government actors than private actors, but also because gov-
ernment employers in fact do have significantly more power over their
employees than ordinary companies do over theirs.  As already seen
from the textual analysis above, the state action doctrine is based on
the unique power of the state and “[t]he central purpose of constitu-
tions [is] the creation of a set of preexisting limits to the interferences
with individual action historically associated with the state.”144
For instance, in United States v. Kahan,145 the Southern District of
New York commented upon this significant difference between the
power of private employers and the power of public employers in car-
rying out workplace searches and the consequence of such searches:
If a private employer suspects misconduct on the part of an
employee, he will not ordinarily conduct an investigation to substan-
tiate criminal charges against him. Rather, he will simply fire that
employee. . . .  In contrast, when a government supervisor begins an
investigation of suspected criminal activities of an employee in the
141 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (“[T]he extra
power the government has in [the government as employer context] comes from the
nature of the government’s mission as employer.  Government agencies are charged
by law with doing particular tasks.  Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as
effectively and efficiently as possible.” (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
674–75 (1994) (plurality opinion))).
142 Although it could be suggested that this is because we assume the workplace
search is highly offensive to a reasonable person when the employer is the govern-
ment, it is appears that the Constitution gives greater protection to public employees
by merely using the word “reasonable” without any further gloss.
143 Kay, supra note 2, at 339.
144 Id. at 341.
145 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 479 F.2d 290 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev’d, 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
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course of his work, the supervisor’s role is no longer that of a man-
ager of an office, but that of a criminal investigator for the govern-
ment.  The purpose of the supervisor’s surveillance is no longer
simply to preserve efficiency in the office.  It is specifically designed
to prepare a criminal prosecution against the employee.  In that
case, searches and seizures by the supervisor or by other govern-
ment agents are governed by the Fourth Amendment admonition
that a warrant be obtained in the absence of exigent
circumstances.146
So whereas both the public and private employer may terminate
or otherwise discipline the employee if there is evidence of employee
malfeasance, the public employer may have greater power in its ability
to retaliate against the employee and to turn over evidence of that
misconduct to other arms of the state for prosecution.  In short,
whereas all that is at stake in an investigatory search in the private
sector is at most the loss of one’s job, the loss also of one’s liberty may
be at stake in the public sector.
Additionally, and importantly, public employers are not limited
by the same market-based forces that limit private-sector employers.
Government employers play a different role in the market economy in
the sense that they are sometime the only game in town.147 Consider
in this regard police officers and prosecutors.  Additionally, govern-
ment employers are not subject to the same market forces as private
employers as far as having the same incentives to get rid of bad
employees who undermine their ability to maximize profits.148
Finally, the goal of government employers is to produce public goods
not produced privately and to promulgate policies the public
desires.149  For all these reasons, and as Pauline Kim aptly observes,
“[i]mposing checks on [public employer] personnel decisions—
including restraints protecting basic constitutional rights—should be
part of,” holding public employers accountable.150
There is one last distinction between public and private employ-
ees that deserves mention. In a very real sense, “We the people” are
146 Id. at 791.
147 See Kim, supra note 54, at 13 (“Although the pool of labor from which they hire
may overlap with that from which private employees are drawn, for some types of jobs
the government is the only relevant employer.”).
148 Id. (“The public employer . . . is largely insulated from these market pressures,
creating the possibility that irrational personnel practices could persist unchecked.”).
149 Id. at 14 (“[I]t is a mistake to assume that the public interest always coincides
with the interests of the public manager. Without the competitive pressures of the
market, the overreaching or corrupt public manager is less likely to be eliminated.”).
150 Id.
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the employers of public employees.151  The citizens of the polity can,
and should, demand more as far as how we want workers treated by
the government.  Indeed, to the extent that public employees are
treated more fairly and with dignity in the workplace, it is less likely
that they will engage in fraud or misconduct that undermines the pub-
lic service.152
Thus, it is not only necessary, but “We the people” should insist
that public employees have a greater level of employment protection
under the federal Constitution to prevent the government from using
its power against these public employees in arbitrary and irrational
ways.153  Even if current Fourth Amendment doctrine is not ade-
quately providing such protection as argued below, the aspiration is
that someday the federal Constitution will provide a meaningful check
on executive discretion,154 so that government employees will not be
targeted with harassment and discrimination through arbitrary
searches and seizures of their physical and electronic locations.155
C. The Oversight Role of Public Employees
Of course, government employers’ exercise of executive power
can devolve into harassment, especially if employees are seeking to
151 “We the people” is the beginning of the preamble to the United States Consti-
tution. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
152 Additionally, as one recent commentator observed: “All of us need to recog-
nize that happy employees are better than unhappy employees and that losing good
employees is expensive.”  Linda A. Klein, Having a Winning Reputation with Engaged
Employees, LAW PRAC. May/June 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publi
cations/law_practice_magazine/2011/may_june/having_a_winning_reputation_with
_engaged_employees.html.
153 See Primus, supra note 8, at 277 (“It is a matter of general consensus that one
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to eliminate or at least substantially reduce
governmental intrusions that are arbitrary.”).
154 Indeed, “the key to preventing arbitrariness in the sphere of the Fourth
Amendment is limiting the discretion of officials who wield executive power.” Id. at
277 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 411 (1974)).  Primus refers to this observation by Amsterdam as “canonical.”
Id.
155 See id. This view of needing a check on the political power of the state
employer is generally shared by Western European countries. See also De Becker,
supra note 85, at 987 (“For all continental countries researched, it is desirable that all
individuals exercising tasks of public authority and working under a direct political
hierarchy be better protected against dismissal or political intervention than in the
private sector.”).
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shed light on government misconduct.156  And even though it is no
doubt true that we need government employers to exercise oversight
of employees to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the govern-
ment service,157 the constitutional rights of public employees should
not be lost in the mix.  More specifically, these employee privacy
rights in the public sector are crucial so that these employees can ful-
fill their role of ensuring government transparency and accountabil-
ity.  As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in the 1974 case of
Arnett v. Kennedy158: “The importance of Government employees’
being assured of their right to freely comment on the conduct of Gov-
ernment, to inform the public of abuses of power and of the miscon-
duct of their superiors, must be self-evident in these times.”159
The times to which Justice Marshall referred were the Watergate
era of the 1970s.  The constitutional right to which he referred was
the right of public employee free speech under the First Amendment.
Indeed, in another First Amendment case in which Marshall wrote the
majority opinion, Pickering v. Board of Education,160 he made clear that
public employees play a unique role in a representative democracy.161
There, in the context of a public school teacher’s critical op-ed in a
local newspaper about his school, he wrote:
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to
have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the
operation of the schools should be spent.  Accordingly, it is essential
that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear
of retaliatory dismissal.162
Indeed, and as I have written elsewhere:
156 Kim, supra note 54, at 14 (“Rather than responding to market discipline, pub-
lic agencies are generally held to account by requiring some measure of transparency
in their operations.”).
157 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Public
employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and
efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the ineffi-
ciency, incompetence, mismanagement, and other work-related misfeasance of its
employees.”).
158 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
159 Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
161 See id. at 572; see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per
curiam) (“The Court has recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of
public concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest
to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to
comment.”).
162 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
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Given the sheer size of American government, it is impossible for
ordinary citizens to keep tabs on everything their government is
doing at any given time.  Government employees therefore must be
the vanguard of the citizenry.  This is so not only because of their
physical proximity to the problem but also because of their special
expertise in dealing with the governmental issues that come to their
attention.163
The same observations about the importance of public employ-
ees’ playing an oversight role can be made today in discussing the loss
of individual privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment in this
time of workplace technological innovation. Such technologies make
monitoring and surveillance of workplace activity all the more
frequent.164
These developments are problematic when one considers that
the rights contained in the Fourth Amendment, like those in the First
Amendment, “create the environment necessary for other freedoms
to flourish.”165  Indeed, like Nadine Strossen, I believe that, “[a]
sound argument can . . . be made that [F]ourth [A]mendment rights
163 Secunda, supra note 53, at 946–47.
164 See Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United
States and Its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 120 (2008)
(“[E]mployee expectations of privacy are yielding to surveillance technologies that
become generally available.”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I for one doubt that people would accept with-
out complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site
they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[C]ell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and
record the location of users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were
more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the United States.” (citing CTIA, 50
Wireless Quick Facts http://www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/AID/10323
(lasted visited Sept. 2, 2012))).
165 Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1241 (1998).  In
this vein, Monrad Paulsen has observed that, “All the other freedoms, freedom of
speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, presuppose that arbitrary and
capricious police action has been restrained.  Security in one’s home and person is
the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.”  Monrad G. Paulsen, The
Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
255, 264 (1961); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[In GPS
monitoring context, I question] the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in
the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse,
especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of
police power to and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198
(1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (claiming that Fourth Amendment freedoms are
“indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect.”).
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should be entitled to the same degree of judicial protection as [F]irst
[A]mendment rights.”166 In the public employment context, this
means that public employees need protection of their Fourth Amend-
ment workplace privacy rights to feel secure acting as the eyes and
ears of other citizens as far as ensuring the appropriateness of govern-
ment conduct.167  Otherwise, public employees might feel impeded in
their ability to express themselves in a way that could potentially pro-
tect other members of society from governmental waste, fraud, and
abuse.  Only through greater workplace privacy rights, then, can pub-
lic employees feel free enough to fulfill this essential societal function.
IV. RESTORING THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
INVESTIGATORY WORKPLACE SEARCHES:
A BIFURCATED APPROACH
Because Quon has pushed public employee privacy rights down to
the level of private employees and because persuasive textual and pru-
dential arguments exist why public employees should have greater pri-
vacy rights than their private-sector counterparts, this Part considers
how to elevate those workplace privacy rights back to the appropriate
level in the public sector.  Borrowing from the dissent of Justice Black-
mun in O’Connor and the concurrence of Justice Stevens in Quon, this
Part makes a two-step argument for a bifurcated approach to work-
place searches of physical or electronic locations in the public sector.
The first part of this proposed approach focuses on the reason
for, or context of, the government employer intrusion.  If the govern-
ment employer’s reason is to investigate workplace misconduct, rather
than merely to obtain routine entry into an employee’s office, then
the second part of this new approach maintains that such searches do
not qualify under the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment.168  As such, a warrant based on probable cause should be
required before such a search is permitted.  This Part concludes by
anticipating two potential criticisms to this proposed approach.
166 Strossen, supra note 168, at 1241.
167 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of iden-
tity is susceptible to abuse.”).
168 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(holding that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment should be aban-
doned “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, makes the warrant and probable-cause require-
ment impracticable”).
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A. Contextualization: Determining the Reason for the
Public Employer Search
First, so that workplace privacy law in the public sector is consis-
tent with the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the applicable con-
stitutional law should at least seek to separate the various reasons for
why a public employer might seek to intrude upon the physical or
electronic locations of its employees in the workplace.169  This is so
because:
[O]nly when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest
that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon
probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a
search would contribute[should] the Court turn to a “balancing”
test to formulate a standard of reasonableness [in] this context.170
Indeed, the Court in O’Connor v. Ortega has already drawn clear
lines between employer intrusion for work-related and law enforce-
ment purposes.171
Consider also in this regard the previously discussed case of
United States v. Kahan, which the Supreme Court cited in O’Connor for
the distinction between work-related and law enforcement searches.
In Kahan, an employee of the federal immigration service attempted
to suppress evidence of criminal misconduct taken by immigration
agents from a desk-side wastebasket used exclusively by the
employee.172  The wastebasket had been routinely checked as part of a
criminal investigation into the employee’s official duties.173  The court
concluded that the checking of the wastebasket constituted a “search”
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because:
(1) the sole purpose of the intrusion was to obtain criminal evi-
dence; (2) the case was distinguishable from those in which a super-
visor or co-worker chances upon criminal evidence while looking
169 See Holbrook, supra note 51, at 835 (“The Article concludes by suggesting that
military courts adopt an analytical framework that explicitly distinguishes between
work-related and law enforcement searches in determining the degree of communica-
tions privacy properly afforded service members.”).
170 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 721 (plurality opinion) (“While police, and even administrative enforce-
ment personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for
use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need
to enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related reasons
wholly unrelated to illegal conduct.”).
172 United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp.784, 789–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
173 Id. at 790.
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through an employee’s desk or wastebasket; and (3) the case did
not involve a supervisor engaged in a work-related inspection.174
Similar considerations can be readily utilized in making the distinc-
tion between work-related searches and those undertaken to ferret
out employee wrongdoing.
Although searches done for noninvestigatory, routine workplace
purposes may still run afoul of Fourth Amendment norms, it is much
more likely that investigatory workplace searches by employers to sup-
port claims of employee malfeasance will unlawfully tread upon
Fourth Amendment interests.175  Or to put it slightly differently, inves-
tigatory workplace searches are much more like law enforcement
searches of private individual’s homes, papers, and personal effects,
where individuals are at the mercy of executive discretion.176
Justice Stevens makes an important distinction in this regard in
his concurrence in Quon. He notes that whereas the search of the
doctor’s office in O’Connor was done to potentially implicate the doc-
tor in wrongdoing, the jury found in Quon that the audit of the
officer’s text message was done to determine whether the current
usage limits for SWAT team pagers were in line with the professional
requirements of the officers.177  So, O’Connor was about an investiga-
tory search to ferret out employee wrongful employee conduct, while
Quon concerned a legitimate, noninvestigatory search for work-related
materials.178
In the Quon situation, one can readily see why employers with
legitimate business justifications should be able to search for work-
place materials without running to a magistrate every time they need
to look for a routine document in an employee’s office.179  In such
174 Holbrook, supra note 51, at 846 (citing Kahan, 350 F. Supp. at 791).
175 See Primus, supra note 8, at 267 (“The normal method of protecting citizens
against arbitrary, discriminatory, and harassing searches is to limit the discretion of
executive officials, . . . by requiring that a neutral decisionmaker issue a warrant
before a government intrusion occurs . . . .”).
176 Id. at 277.
177 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2634 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(distinguishing O’Connor from Quon in an asterisked note).
178 Id. at 2634 n.* (“This case does not implicate that debate [over the proper
standard for evaluation a search] because it does not involve an investigatory search.
The jury concluded that the purpose of the audit was to determine whether the char-
acter limits were sufficient for work-related messages.”).
179 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Govern-
ment agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies
would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered
an employee’s desk for purposes of finding a file or piece of office correspondence.”).
See Primus, supra note 8, at 299 (“[T]he [O’Connor] Court was correct to say in its
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instances, not only does there appear to be a “special need” to free the
government employer from the normal application of the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment, but such a warrant
requirement would greatly undermine the effectiveness and efficiency
of the government workplace.180
B. Reestablishing the Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements for Public
Employer Investigatory Workplace Searches
Noninvestigatory, routine workplace searches, like the one in
Quon, seem to fit nicely into the “special needs analysis.”181  On the
other hand, a requirement of a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
upon probable cause seems more in line with the nature of workplace
investigatory searches which can threaten the livelihood of public
employees.182  As Justice Blackmun commented in his dissent in
O’Connor, just because a search warrant is impracticable for some
workplace searches does not mean it is impractical for all workplace
searches.183  Part of the problem, as Eve Brensike Primus points out, is
that the Justices appear to be applying the “special needs” analysis in
cases where it should not apply.184  Also, it is less likely that an
opinion that it would be impractical to require a warrant every time a government
employer wanted to open an employee’s desk drawer to look for a work-related
document.”).
180 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It is certainly correct
that a public employer cannot be expected to obtain a warrant for every routine entry
into an employee’s workplace.”).
181 Id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he concept of probable cause has little
meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purposes of
securing state property.”).
182 One need only consider the plight of Dr. Ortega after his employer was able to
conduct a fishing expedition to come up with reasons to terminate his employment.
See Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Dr. Ortega claimed
that the defendants’ repeated intrusions constituted an unreasonable and indiscrimi-
nate search—essentially a fishing expedition—aimed at discovering whether there
was any material of any kind in his possession that might be used against him at an
administrative proceeding.”).
183 O’Connor 480 U.S. at 745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing against “dispens-
ing with a warrant in all searches by the employer” and noting “[t]he warrant require-
ment is perfectly suited for many work-related searches” (emphasis omitted)).
184 See Primus, supra note 8, at 299–300 (“Simply declaring that there are ‘special
needs’ in the government employment context, as administrative search doctrine now
makes it natural to do, points judges away from noticing that there may be instances
in which it would be perfectly appropriate to require a government official to get a
warrant before searching an employee’s belongings.”).
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employer would be prejudiced by having to obtain a warrant in such
investigatory situations.185
1. Requiring a Warrant Based on Probable Cause for Investigatory
Searches
The proper departure point for this section is the proposition
that courts should abandon the probable cause requirement “[o]nly
in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the . . . probable-cause
requirement impracticable.”186  Indeed, “a search conducted without
probable cause and a search warrant is unconstitutional except in a
few unusual situations.”187  In those instances when an employer is
seeking evidence of wrongdoing against an employee as part of an
investigatory search, it is not evident why requiring a warrant from a
neutral magistrate is “impracticable” as five Justices determined in
O’Connor188 or qualifies as an “exceptional circumstance” where a spe-
cial needs analysis should apply.  Consider O’Connor itself in this
regard.
Dr. Ortega was out on administrative leave on advice of coun-
sel.189  There was therefore plenty of time to swear out a warrant
before a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.  Indeed, because
the search was done without subjecting it to review by a magistrate,
what resulted was a “general rummaging through the doctor’s office,
desk, and file cabinets.”190  A magistrate would have limited the
infringement on Dr. Ortega’s privacy rights by requiring the Hospital
“to articulate their exact reasons for the search and to specify the
items in Dr. Ortega’s office they sought.”191
185 Indeed, as Justice Blackmun notes in his O’Connor dissent, “the plurality has
failed to explain why, on the facts of this case, obtaining a warrant would have been
burdensome for [the hospital], even if one assumes that they were unfamiliar with
this requirement.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 745 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment) (emphasis added).
187 See Primus, supra note 8, at 255 (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619, 2630 (2010)).
188 In addition to the four-Justice plurality in O’Connor, Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence in O’Connor agreed that special needs existed in the public workplace context
and, therefore, a warrant was not required. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., con-
curring); see also Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2628 (“‘[S]pecial needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement,’ make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble for government employers.” (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725)).
189 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 747 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 743.
191 Id.
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Therefore, like Justice Blackmun in his dissent in O’Connor, this
Article contends that a search warrant should be presumptively
required where the employer is clearly seeking evidence to take
adverse employment action against the employee,192 unless the
employer can show that “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.”193  In other
words, the presumption is that a government search without a warrant
is per se unreasonable unless a “special need” can be established, and
the burden is on the government employer to make such a show-
ing.194  Because neither the plurality nor Justice Scalia in O’Connor,
nor the Court in Quon, explain sufficiently why applying the probable
cause standard would “impose intolerable burdens on public employ-
ers,”195 and the probable cause standard is properly characterized as a
“practical, nontechnical conception,”196 it is unlikely that many public
employers will be able to meet this burden and escape from the war-
rant requirement when undertaking investigatory searches of their
employees’ offices and electronic communications.
Government employers should also have to presumptively obtain
a warrant based on probable cause because investigatory searches of
public employees’ offices are more like criminal searches where evi-
dence is being sought in order to penalize an individual.197  Indeed,
192 Id. (“[B]ecause no ‘special need’ . . . demanded that the traditional warrant
and probable-cause requirements be dispensed with, the [hospital’s] failure to con-
duct the search in accordance with the traditional standard of reasonableness should
end the analysis . . . .”). See Primus, supra note 8, at 300 (“By adopting the special
needs test to cover government employment cases wholesale, rather than differentiat-
ing between different kinds of searches that might occur within the government work-
place, the Court unnecessarily expanded the government’s ability to search
government employees’ offices without any form of judicial or legislative
preclearance.”).
193 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court,
378 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
194 Technological advances could actually now make it much easier for a govern-
ment employer to receive a warrant based on probable cause. See Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1493 (1985) (suggesting
that officials take advantage of technology and update warrant requirements based on
this new technology).  Such telephonic warrants are already available in analogous
criminal law scenarios. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(D)(3); WIS. STAT. § 968.12(3)
(2011); see also Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Govern-
ment Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 729 (1988)
(discussing telephonic warrants in the criminal procedure context).
195 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion).
196 Id. at 747 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
197 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE 382–85 (9th ed. 2007) (noting difficulty of distinguishing “between a
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 39  8-NOV-12 12:00
2012] privatizing  workplace  privacy 315
the requirement of having individualized suspicion for these types of
searches is crucial as a “bulwark against the arbitrary power that could
flow from excessive discretion.”198  Look what happened in O’Connor
in this regard when no individualized suspicion was required: a fishing
expedition through Dr. Ortega’s personal effects.199  Additionally, the
harm inflicted on the individual in such circumstances is greater
because such targeted searches “are more likely to carry the stigmatic
burdens associated with the suspicion of wrongdoing.”200
For all of these reasons, then, workplace investigatory searches
should presumptively201 require a public employer to obtain a warrant
based on probable cause.  Only where the employer can make a show-
ing that obtaining such a warrant would be impracticable under all
the circumstances, should the employer be able to rely on the “special
needs” exception.202
2. Potential Criticism of the Proposed Bifurcated Approach to
Workplace Searches in the Public Sector
The adoption of the warrant and probable cause requirement
presumptively in investigatory workplace searches will doubtlessly lead
to a number of criticisms and concerns.  Chief among them may be:
(1) the subsequent perceived tension between privacy rights and free
speech rights in public sector employment law; and (2) the impact of
this Fourth Amendment approach on federal and state public record
laws.  Each of these will be considered in turn.
search done for ‘administrative’ purposes and a search that is done to obtain evidence
of a criminal violation”); see also Primus, supra note 8, at 272 (“[Government
employee] searches are targeted.  They focus on specific individuals, much as routine
investigative practices do.”).
198 Primus, supra note 8, at 286; see also Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 411
(“[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of executive
officials, who may act despotically and capriciously . . . .”).
199 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
200 Primus, supra note 8, at 272.
201 A warrant based on a probable cause is only presumptively required because
there will be some scenarios where the context of the search and the nature of gov-
ernment employment, say a strip search of prison guards in a state correctional facil-
ity, make the use of the probable cause standard unsuitable.  In such circumstances,
the balancing test offered by the plurality in O’Connor should be utilized. See
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987) (plurality opinion).
202 See Primus, supra note 8, at 310 (“[C]ourts should ask whether complying with
the warrant and probable cause requirements is actually impractical in a given kind of
case.”).
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a. The Relationship Between Fourth and First Amendment
Rights in the Public Employment Context
Critics might be concerned with this bifurcated approach to
investigatory workplace searches under the Fourth Amendment
because it appears to place workplace privacy rights in tension with
public employee free speech rights under the First Amendment.  Cur-
rently, under the Pickering line of cases, courts balance the speech
rights of government employees to comment as citizens on matters of
public concern with the right of the government to run an efficient
public service.203  By applying the warrant and probable cause require-
ments to workplace investigatory searches, the argument goes, Fourth
Amendment privacy rights are being inappropriately placed in a pre-
ferred position as compared to First Amendment speech rights.
There are two responses to this criticism.  The first response is
based purely on the text of the two amendments.  Only the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant based on probable cause being sworn
out with particularity.204  Of course, no such requirement exists under
the First Amendment free speech clause.205
So although free speech rights have long been subject to a bal-
ancing test in the public workplace, a balancing test has only been
required under the Fourth Amendment if a special needs analysis
applies.  The special needs analysis, however, only applies in excep-
tional circumstances where it would be impracticable to obtain a war-
rant.206  The analysis above, however, suggests that it would be
normally practical for government employers to obtain a warrant
before undertaking targeted, investigatory searches of its employees’
physical and electronic locations.  That such a warrant requirement
would require a higher level of scrutiny of privacy rights than the bal-
ancing test does for free speech rights is merely a consequence of the
constitutional text.
Second, and relatedly, the presence of Fourth Amendment free-
doms can be viewed as a necessary precondition for the exercise of
203 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
204 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
205 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
206 Indeed, with noninvestigatory, routine searches of employees’ offices, the spe-
cial needs exception will apply under the proposed approach.
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First Amendment freedoms.207  In other words, all the liberties con-
tained in the Bill of Rights, including free speech rights, could not be
effectively exercised without freedom from arbitrary government
search and seizures.  The U.S. Supreme Court has commented in this
regard: “The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of
knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be
an instrument for stifling liberty of expression.”208  Thus, where pri-
vacy rights are subject to potential governmental overreaching in a
disciplinary context, mere governmental efficiency interests must give
way to fundamental constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment.209
b. Public Record Laws: Personal Records vs. Government
Function Records
Still other critics might be concerned that this proposed
approach is inconsistent with state or federal public record laws,210
which may require public employees to disclose written or electronic
records to the public or their employer without need for a search war-
rant.211  As an initial matter, and notwithstanding the general pre-
sumption of disclosure,212 the public’s right to access public records is
207 See Strossen, supra note 166, at 1241.
208 See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).
209 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms.”).
210 See, e.g., Public Records Law, WIS. STAT. §§ 19.31-.39 (2011).  The general pre-
sumption is that public records are open to the public unless there is a clear statutory or
common law exception. Id. § 19.32(2) (emphasis added) (“‘Record’ means any
material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic informa-
tion is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has
been created or is being kept by an authority.”).  On the federal level, Congress
promulgated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), to
ensure government transparency.
211 In his majority opinion in Quon, Justice Kennedy discusses the potential “oper-
ational realities” in that case and notes that, “[i]t would also be necessary to consider
whether a review of messages sent on police pagers, particularly those sent while
officers are on duty, might be justified for other reasons, including . . . perhaps com-
pliance with state open records laws.  These matters would all bear on the legitimacy
of an employee’s privacy expectation.”  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629
(2010) (citing CAL. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT, CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 6250 et seq. (West
2008)).
212 WIS. STAT. § 19.31 (2011) (“[The Wisconsin Public Records Law] shall be con-
strued in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with
the conduct of governmental business.”).  I rely on the Wisconsin Public Records Law
throughout this section as it represents one of the more stringent public record laws
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not absolute,213 and in Wisconsin and under federal statutes, for
instance, there are some 175 specific exemptions to the public record
law.214  State statutory exemptions protect records ranging from
mental health records to attorney-client privileged documents.215
Additional common law exceptions include preventing disclosure if
privacy or reputational interests are at stake,216 or where such records
are purely personal.217
As far as purely personal e-mails, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recently concluded in Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School District218 that
teachers’ personal e-mails219 sent on school district e-mail accounts and
district-owned computers were not records under the Public Records
Law and need not be disclosed.220  The important point here is that,
“the content of a document must have a connection to a government
function to constitute a record within the meaning of Wis. Stat.
§ 19.32(2).”221
Yet, “if the e-mails were used as evidence in a disciplinary investi-
gation or to investigate the misuse of government resources, the per-
sonal e-mails would be records under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2),”222 and
in the country. See Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 786 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Wis. 2010)
(“If Wisconsin were not known as the Dairy State it could be known, and rightfully so,
as the Sunshine State.  All branches of Wisconsin government have, over many years,
kept a strong commitment to transparent government.”).
213 See WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WISCONSIN PUBLIC RECORDS LAW, WIS. STAT.
§§ 19.31–19.39: COMPLIANCE OUTLINE 20 (2007), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.
us/AWP/2007OMCG-PRO/2007_PR_Outline.pdf.  The Wisconsin statutes and the
federal statutes, such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), con-
tain more than 175 additional exemptions that are applicable to state-government
offices.).
214 See generally State ex. rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997) (discussing some of the exemptions to disclosure, such as pupil records).
215 See WIS. STAT. §§ 51.30, 905.03 (2011).
216 See Woznicki v. Erickson, 549 N.W.2d 699, 700–701 (Wis. 1996).
217 See Schill, 786 N.W.2d at 183 n.4 .
218 Id. at 177.
219 The teachers in Schill did not object to the release of their work-related e-mails,
that is, e-mails with a connection to school district affairs or their official actions as
public employees. Id. at 186.
220 Id. at 185–86 (“The contents of the personal e-mails that the Teachers created
and maintained on government-owned computers pursuant to the government
employer’s permission for occasional personal use of the government e-mail account
and computer are not ‘records’ under [WIS. STAT.] § 19.32(2).”).  As Chief Justice
Abrahamson observed: “We know of no state that has reached the conclusion that the
contents of such personal e-mails should be released to members of the public.” Id.
at 183.
221 Id. at 196.
222 Id. at 185, 208.
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may be subject to disclosure under the Wisconsin Public Record
Laws.223  This is because where there are allegations of misconduct,
“[t]he public has an interest in monitoring how the resources it
finances are used by government employees” and in being able to
“review[ ] the conduct of disciplinary investigations.”224  In such cir-
cumstances, the applicable test would require a custodian of records
to consider all relevant factors to determine “whether permitting
inspection would result in harm to the public interest which [would]
outweigh[ ] the legislative policy recognizing the public interest in
allowing inspection.”225  If the content of the email “is personal in
part and has a connection with the government function in part, then
the custodian [of the records] may need to redact the personal con-
tent and release the portion connected to the government
function.”226
This analysis, however, points to the fact that even if public
employee records are required to be disclosed in some circumstances
to their employer or to the public, there is still substantial room to
protect many types of personal documents and materials which may
exist in that employee’s personal office space.  To the extent that such
materials are not subject to disclosure under the public records law,
they should be protected from targeted, investigatory searches by gov-
ernment employers by the warrant and probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment for the reasons discussed in detail above.
A majority of the Supreme Court in O’Connor appears to sanction
this approach.  Justice Scalia in his concurrence, joined by the four
members of the plurality, observed that, “[c]onstitutional protection
against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make reasonable
223 See id. at 183 (“Personal e-mails are . . . not always records within the meaning
of WIS. STAT. § 19.32(2) simply because they are sent and received on government e-
mail and computer systems.”); see also WIS. STAT. §19.36(10)(b) (2011) (prohibiting
an employee from disclosing employee records relating to a current investigation of
possible employment-related misconduct or potential criminal or civil law violations).
224 See Schill, 786 N.W.2d at 185–86 n.9.  Indeed, when employee records were
implicated in investigations into alleged misconduct, these records have been consid-
ered “public records” under WIS. STAT. § 19.32(2) in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 646 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Wis. 2002) (“In the absence of a statutory
or common law exception, the presumption favoring release can only be overcome
when there is a public policy interest in keeping the records confidential.”); Armada
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 516 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. 1994) (“We have also recog-
nized that there is a public-policy interest in protecting the reputation of its
citizens.”).
225 Woznicki v. Erickson, 549 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Wis. 1996).
226 Schill, 786 N.W.2d at 207.
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intrusions in its capacity as employer.”227  While one may not have a
privacy interest in one’s workplace communications as to the public
because of the operation of the public records law, one can still have a
privacy interest against the government employer if previous employer
actions suggested to the employee that they had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in a physical or electronic location in the workplace.228
For instance, and as Justice Kennedy pointed out in the majority opin-
ion in Quon, “many employers expect or at least tolerate personal use
of [employer-owned communication devices] by employees because it
often increases worker efficiency.”229  Under this scenario, employees
may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their employer-
owned communication devices vis-à-vis their government
employers.230
The important point here is that through contextualization of
the public workplace search—with a focus on both the reason for the
search and the identity of the party seeking to undertake the search—
a more privacy-protective legal standard may be fashioned for investi-
gatory workplace searches in the public sector undertaken to discover
employee wrongdoing.  Indeed, reestablishment of the warrant and
probable cause requirements for investigatory searches will strengthen
public employee workplace privacy rights and restore such rights to an
appropriate higher level of constitutional protection under the
Fourth Amendment than similar common law privacy protections in
the private-sector workplace.
227 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 731 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (agreeing with Justice Scalia’s statement).
228 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“[I]t would be necessary
to ask whether [the supervisor’s] statements could be taken as announcing a change
in [police department] policy, and if so, whether [the supervisor] had, in fact or
appearance, the authority to make such a change and to guarantee the privacy of text
messaging.”).
229 Id. at 2629 (citing Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. 16–20); see
Schill, 786 N.W.2d at 182 (“As a part of normal workplace operation, many govern-
ment offices, like many private employers, have chosen to allow their employees to
send and receive occasional personal messages on the employer’s e-mail system.”); see
also id. at 183 (“Reasonable government workplace policies in line with private sector
practice help government attract and retain skilled employees.”).
230 See Schill, 786 N.W.2d at 196 (“[T]here is a distinction between allowing public
oversight of employees’ use of public resources and invoking the Public Records Law
to invade the private affairs of public employees by categorically revealing the con-
tents of employees’ personal e-mails.”).
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CONCLUSION
All employees, whether public or private, should retain some rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their physical and electronic loca-
tions at work.  Such privacy rights promote productivity, positively
impact employee morale, and support the recruiting and retention of
highly competent employees.  The proper level of privacy protection,
this Article maintains, should be based on whether the search involves
a public sector or private sector workplace.  Public sector workers are
entitled to greater levels of privacy protections than their private sec-
tor counterparts based on the text of the Constitution, the immense
power of the government as employer, and the critical oversight role
public employees play in a representative democracy.
To ensure this higher level of workplace privacy protection for
public employees, and to reverse the equalization of public and pri-
vate workplace privacy rights post-Quon, this Article argues that public
employer searches of employee physical and electronic locations in
the workplace should be bifurcated based on the nature of the search.
If the search is undertaken for routine, noninvestigatory purposes, the
special needs exception to the warrant requirement should apply and
such searches should be considered reasonable without a warrant if
related to legitimate work reasons and reasonable in scope.  On the
other hand, investigatory workplace searches to uncover employee
misconduct or wrongdoing should be treated like other targeted gov-
ernment searches where a sanction or penalty is possible.  Such
searches should require the employer to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause in front of a neutral magistrate unless the employer
can prove that special needs exist to conduct the investigatory search
without a warrant.
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